What can we learn about monetary policy transparency from financial market data? by Courtenay, Roger & Clare, Andrew
What can we learn about
monetary policy transparency







of the Deutsche Bundesbank
February 2001
The discussion papers published in this series represent
the authors’ personal opinions and do not necessarily reflect the views
of the Deutsche Bundesbank.Deutsche Bundesbank, Wilhelm-Epstein-Strasse 14, 60431 Frankfurt am Main,
P.O.B.  10 06 02, 60006 Frankfurt am Main, Federal Republic of Germany
Telephone  (0 69) 95 66-1
Telex within Germany  4 1 227, telex from abroad  4 14 431, fax  (0 69) 5 60 10 71
Internet: http://www.bundesbank.de
Please address all orders in writing to: Deutsche Bundesbank,
Press and Public Relations Division, at the above address, or by fax No. (0 69) 95 66-30 77
Reproduction permitted only if source is stated.
ISBN  3–933747–31–7Abstract
In this paper we investigate the impact of UK macroeconomic news announcements on
selected futures contracts and exchange rates.  We include a wide set of scheduled public
news announcements in our study, including official interest rate decisions.  We investigate
whether the reaction to these announcements has changed since the Bank of England was
granted operational independence in May 1997.  Our results indicate that there may well
have been changes in the way that financial markets incorporate key economic data into
securities prices.  In particular, we document an increase in the speed of the reaction to
interest rate announcements, but also some evidence of a fall in the size of the full reaction.Zusammenfassung
In diesem Papier wird untersucht, wie in Großbritannien makroökonomische Neuigkeiten
auf ausgewählte Terminkontrakte und Wechselkurse wirken. In der Studie wird eine breite
Palette regelmäßig veröffentlichter Daten betrachtet, einschließlich der Entscheidungen
über die Notenbankzinsen. Wir untersuchen, ob die Reaktionen auf diese Ankündigungen
sich geändert haben, seit der Bank von England im Mai 1997 operationelle Unabhängigkeit
gewährt worden ist. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass durchaus Veränderungen zu verzeichnen
sind in der Art und Weise, wie auf den Finanzmärkten ökonomische Daten die
Wertpapierpreise ändern. Insbesondere dokumentieren wir, dass die Reaktionen auf
Zinsänderungen schneller erfolgen aber auch, dass die Stärke der Reaktionen geringer ist.Table of Contents
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What can we learn about monetary policy
transparency from financial market data?∗
1  Introduction
A number of researchers have focused on the role of macroeconomic and public news
announcements as a source of financial market volatility.  A large number of such studies
investigate the impact of macroeconomic news announcements on foreign exchange rates
(see Almeida, Goodhart and Payne (1998), Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) or Kim
(1998)), while others look at the impact of macroeconomic announcements on stock prices
(see Mitchell and Mulherin (1994)), bond prices (see Fleming and Remolona (1997), Jones
et al (1994) or Clare et al (1999)), interest rates (Becker et al (1995)) and derivative prices
(see Ederington and Lee (1993, 1995) or ap Gwilym et al (1998)).  In this paper we study
the impact of scheduled UK macroeconomic news announcements on three of the most
popular futures contracts traded on LIFFE - the short sterling, long gilt and FTSE 100
contracts - and on the dollar/sterling and Deutsche Mark/sterling foreign exchange rates,
using a methodology due to Ederington and Lee (1995).
The purpose of this paper relates to the granting of operational independence to the Bank of
England on 6 May 1997 by the UK Government.  This decision by the new Labour
Government changed the monetary policy environment in the United Kingdom.  Prior to
this date, interest rate decisions were taken by the Chancellor of the Exchequer after a
monthly meeting with the Governor of the Bank of England, where the Governor offered
advice to the Chancellor.  The minutes of these meetings were subsequently published.
Following the announcement of operational independence, interest rate decisions are now
made by the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), which consists of nine
members:  five from the Bank itself (the Governor, two Deputy Governors, the Chief
Economist and the Executive Director responsible for financial market operations) and four
external members, chosen from industry and academia.  The Committee’s decisions are
taken with the aim of keeping inflation close to a target rate of 2½% a year, set by the
Chancellor.  Another stated aim of this change in regime was that monetary policy should
be more transparent than under previous regimes.  An increasing number of academic
papers have focussed on the theoretical aspects of monetary policy transparency.  This
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change in the monetary policy framework gives us a rare opportunity to study how such a
change can influence the way that key economic data are impounded into financial prices,
and perhaps the extent to which the Bank of England has been successful in making UK
monetary policy more transparent.1 It also gives us an opportunity to interpret some the
results in the light of these relatively new theoretical models.
We use two sets of intra-day data on UK financial prices.  The first set comprises intra-day
data from LIFFE on FTSE 100, short sterling and long gilt futures contracts spanning the
period from January 1994 to June 1999.  The second data set comprises intraday quotes on
the dollar/sterling and Deutsche Mark/sterling exchange rates, over the same period.  Using
these two data sets we investigate whether there has been a change in the way that key UK
scheduled macroeconomic news announcements impact on these markets.  Crucially, the
announcements that we consider include the key monetary policy announcements −  official
interest rate decisions, the publication of the Bank of England’s Inflation Report and the
minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee’s monthly meeting −  which have not been
considered previously.
In anticipation of our conclusions, a comparison of the reactions pre and post operational
independence does not reveal simple, definitive conclusions about whether monetary
policy is now better understood by financial market participants as a result of this regime
change.  The total (cumulative) reaction of the LIFFE contracts and exchange rates to
interest rate changes appears to be either unchanged or lower in the post Bank
independence period, depending on the market observed, although these differences are
rarely significant in a statistical sense.  However, the immediate reaction in the first five
minutes is larger in all of the markets studied here.  With respect to other key
macroeconomic data, the short sterling, long gilt and FTSE 100 contracts exhibit a smaller
reaction to these data releases in the post Bank independence period, while conversely the
exchange rates studied here exhibit a larger reaction.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.  In Section 2 we consider briefly the
way in which the impact that economic data has on financial prices might be expected to
change following a change in monetary policy;  in Section 3 we undertake a review of
some of the related academic literature;  in Section 4 we introduce the data;  in Section 5
we present  simple results designed to highlight some key stylised facts;  in Section 6 we
employ a variant of the Ederington and Lee (1995) methodology to determine whether the
announcements in our study have a significant impact on asset prices using the whole
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sample period, while in Section 7 we use the same methodology to determine the degree to
which the change in the United Kingdom’s monetary policy regime has led to a systematic
change in the way that economic data now impacts on financial markets;  and finally, we
conclude in Section 8.
2  Theoretical considerations2
2.1  The recent literature
One aim of the empirical part of this paper is to establish whether monetary policy in the
UK is more transparent following the granting of operational independence to the Bank of
England in May 1997.  Partly inspired by the adoption of more transparent monetary policy
regimes amongst a number of western central banks and partly by the debate about the
ECB’s transparency, a growing number of recent papers have focused on the role of
transparency in the monetary policy process.
Cuikerman (2000) draws attention to two particular difficulties which monetary authorities
face in trying to become truly transparent.  Firstly, in trying to signal to the public the
economic model which they use in their decision making process, they are hindered by the
fact that there is no consensus in the economics profession about the ‘correct’ model.  This
lack of consensus clearly becomes more critical when decisions are made collectively
rather than by a single individual.  Secondly, Cuikerman argues that when central banks are
self-confessed flexible inflation targeters it is difficult in this case for the general public to
work out just how flexible the monetary authorities will be when faced, for example, with a
large supply shock.  According to Cuikerman this uncertainty can only be removed if the
monetary authorities have responsibility only for maintaining price stability and no
responsibility for smoothing fluctuations in output, i.e. that they become strict inflation
targeters.
Theoretical papers on the desirability of monetary policy transparency can be found to
support the view that it is desirable in terms of social welfare or to refute this claim.
Geraats (2000a) shows how transparency can help to reduce equilibrium inflation rates and
give the central bank greater flexibility to respond to economic shocks.  She argues that full
transparency involves the publication of the central bank’s conditional forecasts of inflation
and output.  In contrast to this result, Jensen (2000) shows that full transparency may not
always be desirable.  Modelling the economy using a New Keynesian “Phillips curve”
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framework he shows that the benefits of transparency depend crucially upon the credibility
of the central bank.  When the central bank initially has little credibility more transparency
forces the central bank to focus on its inflation target and less upon any output target which
it might have.3 However, when the central bank is seen to be credible Jensen shows that
transparency involves a loss in terms of stabilising output fluctuations.  Perhaps the main
difference between the results of Jensen (2000) and Geraats (2000a) is the underlying
model of the economy used - Geraats (2000a) uses a Lucas-style supply function rather
than the New Keynesian model used by Jensen (2000).
The stylised message from the time-inconsistency literature which has its origins in
Kydland and Prescott (1977), is that a central bank that commits to a policy rule can
eliminate any inflationary bias which might otherwise exist. Geraats (2000b) revisits this
idea to investigate the issue of monetary policy transparency. Essentially by changing the
timing of the ‘game’, with the central bank moving first and the private sector then forming
its expectations about future inflation second, rather than the other way around, Geraats
(2000b) shows that it is necessary for the bank to be more transparent about the shocks to
which it is responding to reduce any inflation bias which exists.4 In the extreme case of
perfect economic transparency an inflation bias may be eliminated completely.  In showing
that greater economic transparency is sufficient to eliminate an inflation bias, whereas pre-
commitment to a monetary policy rule is not, Geraats (2000b) argues that this may explain
why newly redesigned monetary policy procedures are not accompanied by commitment to
rules, but rather by a commitment to publish “inflation reports”.
Finally, we might note that the theoretical literature distinguishes between different types
of transparency.5 For example, Gerbasch and Hahn (2000) define three types of
transparency: goal, knowledge and operational transparency.  Goal transparency is defined
as transparency about the objectives of monetary policy, for example the announcement of
a specific inflation target would fall into this category.  Knowledge transparency involves
informing economic agents about the central bank’s views about the shocks with which
committee members are currently concerned.  The inflation reports now widely published
by central banks generally aim at improving knowledge transparency.  Finally, operational
transparency refers to the process of setting monetary policy and the micro level decisions,
for example like whether the key interest rate decisions should be made by the central bank
President/Governor, or by a committee etc.
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2.2 The impact of greater transparency on financial prices
With this literature and the Gerbasch and Hahn (2000) definitions of monetary policy
transparency in mind, can we say anything about the consequences of greater transparency
in practice, rather than in theory ?  For instance, how would the introduction of a more
transparent monetary policy regime affect the way in which the information contained in
scheduled macroeconomic news announcements is impounded into financial prices ?
The reaction of financial prices to news should be determined by the extent to which the
news changes market perceptions about the future payoff of the relevant security.  For
example, an announcement that changes expectations about long-term economic growth
and inflation should, other things being equal, have some effect on the values of long-term
assets.  The announcement of Bank independence caused UK 20-year bond yields to fall by
around 40 basis points on the day.
If monetary policy is transparent in terms of its goal and in the way in which information
about economic shocks are dealt with, then it may be possible for economic agents to
predict interest rate decisions accurately using publicly available macroeconomic data.  In
this case any interest rate decision made by the authorities may subsequently contain less
information than ones made under a less transparent regime, in turn causing a lower
response from securities prices.  News will, however, be conveyed in macroeconomic data
releases.  Over a period when the monetary policy process becomes more transparent, the
reaction to these macroeconomic announcements could therefore increase while the
reaction to interest rate decisions declines (Haldane and Read (1999) also propose this
hypothesis).
In a world of perfectly transparent monetary policy then it is possible that monetary policy
could be become devoid of any news content for financial markets.  However, this is never
likely to happen in reality as Vickers (1998) says:
“While transparency – inflation reports, MPC minutes, Treasury Committee hearings and
so on – increases what is in the public domain (desirably in my view), there is surely
information relevant for policy-making that is simply incapable of being put in the public
domain.”
In this comment Vickers is referring to the complex process which each committee
member goes through in assimilating all the information relevant to his or her decision,
which is then turned into a decision with the help of his or her ‘economic model’ of the
economy.  For each member of any  monetary policy committee this is indeed a complex
task which is difficult enough to convey concisely to the public, but when the interest rate– 6 –
decision is a collective one, we must bear in mind the added complexity involved with
collating each members’ views to form one collective judgement (see Cuikerman (2000)).
If market agents’ felt that they did not understand (or could not second guess) the dynamics
of committee decisions adequately, in spite of the existence of both goal and knowledge
transparency, then interest rate decisions would still convey useful information for market
participants. The issue of monetary policy decision making by one, powerful individual
(possibly a politician as in the UK prior to Bank of England independence), or via majority
voting by a committee of individually accountable experts, is one aspect of operational
transparency as defined by Gerbasch and Hahn (2000).  In this case the underlying
macroeconomic data might be less informative, and the key policy decisions might be more
informative.
In summary, any improvement in the transparency of monetary policy might bring about a
change in the way that both interest rate decisions and other macroeconomic
announcements are incorporated into securities prices.  It is possible that changes in the
reactions to these two types of announcements may be in opposite directions.
3  Previous empirical literature
Previous empirical research aimed at understanding the way in which the information
embodied in scheduled macroeconomic announcements is impounded into securities prices
has found that these announcements do have a significant impact upon securities prices.
Most of the research has been conducted with respect to US securities.  Using regression
analysis, where announcements are represented by dummy variables in OLS regressions,
Ederington and Lee (1993) used intraday data for T-bond, eurodollar and dollar/Deutsche
Mark futures contracts to identify those US macroeconomic news announcements that had
the greatest impact on these contracts.  They found that the most important announcements
for the interest rate contracts were scheduled news announcements relating to employment,
PPI, CPI, durable goods orders, industrial production −  capacity utilisation, construction
activity, the NAPM survey and the Federal budget.  For the Deutsche Mark contract the US
merchandise trade deficit, GNP and retail sales were also important.  Ederington and Lee
also found that the majority of the price adjustment in their sample occurred within the first
minute, with subsequent price movements seemingly independent of this first-minute
change.6 Price volatility remained much higher than usual for around 15 minutes after the
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announcements, statistically and significantly higher for around 40 to 45 minutes and
slightly higher for several hours following the announcement.  Using the same set of
contracts but a different methodology, involving the comparison of securities prices around
news announcements with the behaviour associated with equivalent periods that did not
involve announcements, Ederington and Lee (1995) focused on price behaviour from the 2
minutes prior to the announcements to 10 minutes after.  They found that the price reaction
began within the first 10 seconds after the announcement and was over after another 40 to
50 seconds. 7
Fleming and Remolona (1997), also employing a regression approach, used inter-dealer
data for the US T-bond market, focusing on the possible implications that a particular
market microstructure might have on the absorption of scheduled macroeconomic news
announcements.  To highlight some of the potential market microstructure issues they
monitored the reactions of trade volume as well as price changes to the announcements.
They found that 9 announcements had a statistically significant effect upon T-bond prices
and 14 had an effect on trading activity.  By decomposing the announcements into their
expected and unexpected components using MMS forecast data they identified a further 6
announcements that had a significant impact upon the US T-bond market.  As it is possible
that the reaction of a market to a particular news announcement may vary depending upon
the state of the world, Fleming and Remolona (1997) controlled for the economic cycle by
using either a measure of implied volatility, or the expected change in the Fed funds rate as
a proxy for market conditions.  They found that durable goods orders, GDP, housing starts
and employment announcements had a more significant impact upon T-bond prices and
trading volumes once the economic cycle had been accounted for.  In a similar vein, and
using daily data, McQueen and Roley (1993) found that by classifying economic activity as
being either ‘high’, ‘medium’ or ‘low’ relative to trend, it was easier to identify reactions
of the US stock market to US macroeconomic announcements.
Far less work of this nature has been conducted using UK-specific securities market data.
Using high-frequency derivatives data from LIFFE, ap Gwilym et al (1998) investigated
the impact of UK scheduled macroeconomic news announcements on LIFFE’s FTSE 100
and short sterling futures contracts.  They considered the impact of nine different
announcement types, finding that the RPI, PPI and PSBR announcements all had a
significant impact on FTSE 100 contracts, and that RPI, PPI, labour market statistics and
retail sales announcements had a significant impact on short sterling contracts.  Using the
Ederington and Lee approach with a 12-minute window around the announcements, they
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found less price volatility than had been found in equivalent US studies in the 2 minutes
prior to announcements, and a sharp reaction which peaked in the first 90 seconds, which
subsequently remained significantly higher for another 5 to 6 minutes.  The number of
transactions remained high for around 10 minutes.  The authors also found some evidence
to suggest that price overreaction existed in the LIFFE pits in the first minute after the
announcement.  Clare et al (1999) extended the Ederington and Lee approach to examine
the impact of scheduled UK macroeconomic news announcements on gilt market volatility
and trading volumes.  They found tentative evidence to suggest that the increase in
volatility that follows these announcements is associated with an increase in both the size
of price changes and the average size of trades, but not with an increase in the number of
gilt market trades.
To date little empirical work has been conducted in using event study techniques to address
issues of monetary policy transparency as seen by market participants.  Some recent studies
have made use of daily data to approach this issue.  Haldane and Read (1999) looked at the
response of the UK yield curve to official interest rate changes, using daily data from
January 1984 to May 1997 (the start of the Bank independence period).  They conclude that
the response of the UK yield curve to a 1% change in official interest rates fell following
the adoption of inflation targeting in October 1992, particularly at maturities up to two
years.  In a related study, Joyce and Read (1999) looked at the reaction of UK bond prices
to RPI announcements from January 1982 to April 1997.  They found that over the
inflation targeting period beginning in October 1992 bond prices became less responsive to
RPI announcements, and they interpret this as a sign of improved monetary policy
credibility.  Finally, using daily data Siklos (2000) investigates whether the Bank of
Canada has been successful in making monetary policy more transparent following a
number of measures such as the publication of a regular inflation report (the Monetary
Policy Report) and the announcement of a formal inflation target.  By calculating an
unconditional measure of kurtosis as a proxy for uncertainty over various sub-periods,
Siklos shows, for example, that uncertainty in Canadian financial markets was “especially
high” when changes in the overnight rate of 50 basis points or more were made.
4   Data
4.1  LIFFE data
The tick-by-tick futures contract data used in this study are provided by LIFFE for the
FTSE 100, short sterling and long gilt futures contracts traded on this exchange between
January 1994 and June 1999.  The data contain details of all trades in the contracts, and– 9 –
give the time to the nearest second, the price and the number of contracts traded.  Most
bids and asks are also recorded, but these are not matched, and at times of heavy trading
the pit observers do not record all of these.8
The data used are generally for the most heavily traded contract.  For the short sterling
contract the nearest-to-maturity contract is used at all times.  For the long gilt and FTSE
100 contracts we use the nearest-to-maturity contract until the trading volume on the next
contract becomes greater.  This generally occurs about three to four weeks prior to maturity
for the former and at maturity for the latter.  Since the futures price is linked by an arbitrage
condition to the spot value of the index, the move to a new contract has virtually no
implications for this study.  We therefore pay no regard to contract changeovers in what
follows.  The close link between futures markets and the markets for the underlying asset
also indicates that the results will be a good proxy for the reaction of the underlying asset.
4.2  Foreign exchange data
The foreign exchange data used here were provided by Olsen & Associates and consist of
foreign exchange quote data gathered from Reuters, Knight-Ridder and Telerate.  Foreign
exchange quote data of this kind has been used extensively in the past to investigate:  the
behaviour of foreign exchange market volatility (see for example Andersen and Bollerslev
(1997)); issues relating to foreign exchange market liquidity (see for example Hartmann
(1996));  and issues relating to foreign exchange market volume (see for example Melvin
and Yin (1996)).9 We use the dollar/sterling and Deutsche Mark/sterling exchange rates
between January 1994 and June 1999.  The data are available on the tapes provided by
Olsen on a 24-hour basis.  We have deleted those days from the data set which correspond
to a UK bank holiday.  Even though the currency pairs are still traded elsewhere in the
world, trading volume is substantially lower.  Each line on the data file for each cross rate
contains:  a time stamp of the quote entry (GMT);  bid and offer quotes;  and codes
denoting the country, city and institution of the dealer submitting the quote.  In the analysis
which follows we use the mid - prices of these cross rates.
4.3  Data transformation
We transform the irregularly spaced data in both data sets into calendar time intervals.  For
example, when we calculate returns over a five-minute interval, this return is defined as the
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log of the ratio of the closing price of the previous five-minute interval to the opening price
for the subsequent five-minute interval.  For the first window in each day the opening price
is taken to be the first transaction of that day.  When we calculate the number of trades
using the LIFFE contracts we simply count the number of trades that occur in each five-
minute interval.
4.4  Macroeconomic announcement data
The macroeconomic announcement data consist of those announcements listed in the MMS
database, supplemented by the inclusion of: MPC interest rate decisions (including ‘no
change’ decisions) since the Bank of England was granted operational independence on 6
May 1997;  and official interest rate changes up to (and including) 6 May.  The full set of
macroeconomic announcements that we use in our study is presented in Table 1, along with
their release times and their frequency during our sample period.
The announcements reach the market at the official announcement time, which is generally
9.30 am for macroeconomic data releases and is currently 12.00 pm for interest rate
decisions.  The Inflation Report and the MPC minutes are made available to journalists in a
secure location within the Bank an hour and half an hour respectively before the official
announcement time.  This allows Press reports to be made, and hence an informed reaction
to take place, within a very short time of the official announcement.
5  Announcement versus non-announcement behaviour
In this section we present a formal analysis of the impact of these announcements on
LIFFE contract prices and on the two exchange rates.  To this end we employ the
announcement versus non-announcement day methodology of Ederington and Lee (1995)10
by splitting the sample period into days when the announcements were made
(announcement days) and those days when they were not (non-announcement days) (see
Table 1). We use the split between announcement and non-announcement days to
investigate the pattern of price volatility (mean absolute returns)11 and trading activity
around the macroeconomic announcements.  The differences in the mean absolute returns
and mean number of trades between announcement and non-announcement days are tested
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using a non-parametric statistic.12 The non-parametric test which we use is the Kruskall-















where J=2, since there are only two series, i.e. the announcement and non-announcement
series;  N is the total number of observations from both series combined;  mj is the number
of observations from series j;  and Sj is the rank sum for series j.  This test statistic is
distributed χ
2(J-1) under the null hypothesis of equal medians.
We prefer to use this approach rather than the more commonly used dummy variable
regression approach.  High-frequency data such as these generally have highly persistent
conditionally heteroskedastistic components and outliers, which make parametric
inferences inappropriate (see Andersen, Bollerslev and Das (1999) for a critique of
parametric inference with such data).  The methodology we use should give a more
statistically reliable framework for comparing the differences between announcement and
non-announcement day behaviour.
In order to determine the size and speed of the impact of macroeconomic news
announcements on the sterling exchange rates and LIFFE futures prices, we compared the
behaviour in the period around announcements, with the behaviour on ‘non-announcement’
days, for a sequence of one- minute windows.  Since announcements occur at different
times of day we used event time rather than calendar time to construct the data set for the
periods around the announcements, with all announcements said to occur at time zero.13
Also, since market behaviour changes throughout the day, we constructed the non-
announcement data set so that its time-of-day profile matched its announcement
counterpart.  In other words, we constructed the non-announcement data set so that it had
the same proportion of observations around each announcement time (eg. 9:30 am, 12:00
pm etc) as the announcement data set.
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of the elapsed time between each trade.– 12 –
6  Reactions pre and post-Bank independence
In this section of the paper we investigate the hypothesis that there has been a systematic
change in the way that scheduled macroeconomic news announcements are now absorbed
into securities prices with the advent of the Bank of England’s operational independence.
As noted above, this independence was granted on 6 May 1997 by the UK Government
with the remit that the Bank should aim to achieve an inflation target of 2½% a year;
monetary policy decisions are now taken by the MPC.
6.1  Pre and post-BI reactions to macroeconomic announcements
In our empirical analysis we monitor the pattern of price reactions by calculating returns for
each one minute window from 10 minutes before announcements to 60 minutes after, using
these to calculate mean absolute returns (effectively a measure of volatility) and mean
cumulative absolute returns over the same period.14 The cumulated values are adjusted for
similarly-calculated values for periods without announcements to produce cumulative
absolute abnormal returns (CAARs), which can be used to measure the extent of the
reaction to news announcements.
As an example of the kind of impact which macroeconomic data releases have on securities
prices, in Chart 1 we plot the mean absolute return for one minute windows from 10
minutes before announcements to 60 minutes after, for the LIFFE short sterling contract.
The chart shows the average reaction of this contract to all the macroeconomic
announcements in our data set over the full sample period from 1994 to 1999.  It is clear
that these announcements have a pronounced impact upon contract volatility immediately
following the announcement.  This volatility remains higher than on non-announcement
days for approximately fifty minutes, and is very much higher in the first five minutes or
so.  We apply a non parametric test (the Kruskal-Wallis test) to determine whether this
higher volatility was significantly higher or not in a statistical sense.  The results showed
that volatility following macroeconomic announcements relative to volatility on non-
announcement days was significantly higher at the 99% level of confidence for each of the
twenty-two one  minute windows following these announcements.  The question however,
is whether post-Bank independence volatility is significantly different from pre-Bank
independence volatility.
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We begin our analysis of this question by separating the interest rate announcements from
the other macroeconomic announcements, where we apply the generic term -
‘macroeconomic announcements’ - to this second set.  Chart 2 shows the difference
between the mean CAARs on announcement days and non-announcement days, for the pre
and post Bank independence periods, for the two sets of announcements, macroeconomic
announcements and interest rate announcements.  Table 2 gives the results of tests of the
difference between the magnitude of the mean CAARs in the pre- and post-Bank
independence periods after 5, 15 and 60 minutes.
6.2  Interest rate announcements
First consider the figures in Chart 2, column 1 which relate to interest rate announcements.
For all three futures contracts the immediate reaction to interest rate announcements in the
post-Bank independence period is higher than in the pre-Bank independence period.
However, when we look beyond the initial period we can see that after approximately ten
minutes the reaction is lower for the two interest rate contracts and approximately the same
in the equity market. With respect to the exchange rate figures in Chart 2, column 1, the
immediate reaction is also greater in the post-Bank independence period compared with the
pre-Bank independence period.  But after approximately thirty minutes the total impact of
the interest rate announcements is very similar in both periods.  These results could then be
interpreted as broadly supporting the idea that monetary policy is less interesting, as the
overall impact of Bank independence on the different markets has either been to reduce the
reaction to interest rate changes, or to have little noticeable impact overall.
The test statistics in Panel A, of Table 2 indicate that for the five minutes following the
interest rate announcements the increase in volatility in the interest rate contracts is
statistically significant.  However, this is not true for the FTSE-100 contract or for the
exchange rates.  Looking further ahead, we also provide test statistics for the difference in
volatility between the two periods after both fifteen and sixty minutes.  While the figures in
Chart 2 are indicative of a systematic change, the non-parametric test indicates that none of
the observed differences are significant after fifteen or sixty minutes after the
announcement.  With respect to the volatility of these markets further away from the initial
event then, we must be careful in drawing too firm a conclusion from column 1 of Chart 2.
6.3  Macroeconomic announcements
Turning to the reactions to the set of macroeconomic announcements shown in Chart 2,
column 2, we can see that for the LIFFE contracts the post Bank independence reactions
are lower than the pre Bank independence reactions at all the horizons considered here.– 14 –
This is in sharp contrast to the results for the exchange rates.  In the FOREX market there
appears to have been a clear post Bank independence increase in reactions following
macroeconomic announcements at all horizons.  The difference between the two sets of
results are puzzling.  They suggest that there has been an upward shift in the perceived
importance of macroeconomic data to FOREX markets relative to other markets.
These results are supported strongly by the test statistics presented in Panel B of Table 2
for the five minute period following the announcements.  It is also clear that for the long
gilt and FTSE-100 contracts there is still significantly lower volatility sixty minutes after
the announcements (and after fifteen minutes for the short sterling contract).
7   Conclusions
In this paper we have examined the extent to which the change in the United Kingdom’s
monetary policy arrangements, which occurred in 1997, has changed the way in which UK
economic announcements are impounded into financial prices.  The total (cumulative)
reaction of the LIFFE contracts and exchange rates to interest rate changes appears to be
either unchanged or lower in the post-Bank independence period, depending on the market
observed.  This supports the idea that the news content of monetary policy announcements
may have fallen.  However, while the total reaction supports this view, the differences in
pre versus post-independence behaviour are rarely significantly different from one another
in a statistical sense at these longer (30 to 60 minute) horizons.  The immediate reaction to
interest rate changes in the first 5 minutes is larger in all of the markets studied here and
the difference between the pre and post-independence reactions at this horizon are
frequently very significant.  With respect to interest rate changes then it appears that the
news contained in the decisions is incorporated into financial prices more quickly than in
the pre-Bank independence era.  One possible explanation for this is that pre-positioning in
the financial markets ahead of the decision has become more sophisticated since Bank
independence, with the publication of a clear, unambiguous timetable for the
announcements of interest rate decisions.  Another explanation is that financial market
technology has been improved in a way that allows for a faster reaction.  Although, we
cannot rule this explanation out completely, we believe that the technology during this
period did not change sufficiently (if at all in some cases) to account for these changes.
We also tested for a change in the way that the markets studied here absorbed
macroeconomic data following Bank independence.  Looking at exchange rate responses,
there is very clear evidence to support the idea that FX market agents now pay more
attention to macroeconomic data announcements than in the pre-independence period.– 15 –
This evidence appears to suggest that the underlying economic data have become more
important in these markets relative to the key monetary policy announcement.  A different
picture emerges when we consider the impact of the same set of announcements on all
three LIFFE contracts, which is lower in the post-Bank independence period.  If we
consider this evidence along with the fact that the immediate impact of interest rate
changes on these contracts was higher in the post-independence period, then we might
conclude that, relatively speaking, the macro data were less important than the key
monetary policy decision and therefore that the markets were still learning about the
MPC’s reaction function over this period.  This seems to be a reasonable possibility given
that prior to independence market agents were only having to ‘second-guess’ one person −
the Chancellor −  whereas after the change they had to play the game with the nine members
of the committee, whose votes and therefore opinions all carried (and continue to carry) the
same weight.  However, if we consider this evidence along with the fact that the overall
impact of interest rate changes on these financial prices was lower, or unchanged, in the
post independence period, this could be taken to imply that both the key interest rate
decision and the general UK macroeconomic data were both relatively less important, or at
least no more important, in the post-independence period.  If one is willing to accept this
interpretation of our results, then this may suggest that the UK economic environment has
become of less importance to the sterling-denominated financial prices considered here −  a
distinct possibility given the globalisation of financial markets.  This might in turn imply
that, relatively speaking, UK domestic economic news will be of less relevance than
international economic news in the future.15
                                                
15 We intend to pursue this question in future work of this kind.– 16 –
Table 1:   The macroeconomic announcement set
No of Release
observations time(s)
Interest rate change (pre BI) 10 09:40, 09:45, 11:00, 12:00
Interest rate decision (post BI) 25 12:00
RPI M/M 66 09:30
RPIX Y/Y 65 09:30
PPI input M/M 66 09:30
PPI output M/M 66 09:30
Average Earnings 61 09:30
Unemployment 65 09:30
Prel. GDP Q/Q 22 09:30
Revised GDP Q/Q 22 09:30
Final GDP Q/Q 21 09:30
Ind Prod  M/M 66 09:30
Retail sales M/M 66 09:30
PSBR 66 09:30
M0 M/M 66 09:30
M4 M/M 64 09:30
Consumer credit 67 09:30
Current Account 21 09:30
Global visible trade 67 09:30
Ex-EU visible trade 66 09:30
CIPM 38 09:30
CBI Dist trades 40 09:30, 10:00, 11:00, 11:30
CIPS services survey 26 09:30
CBI Ind Trends 40 11:00, 11:30– 17 –
Table 2:    Abnormal reactions to announcements post- vs. pre-BI
Announcement type Short
Sterling
Long Gilt FTSE-100 GBP-EM GBP-USD
mins.
PANEL A
Interest Rate changes 5 2.06** 5.58** 15.23 4.76 5.81
15 -2.61 -18.45 -3.45 8.28 11.60
60 -2.29 -10.24 6.30 -2.90 -9.10
PANEL B
Macroeconomic data 5 -0.08*** -1.58*** -2.19*** 2.74*** 2.52***
announcements 15 -0.31** -3.90 -3.87*** 1.99 1.43
60 -0.60 -2.74*** -7.90*** 0.80 1.10
Notes: The figures are given by the reactions in the pre-BI period minus the reactions in the post-BI period where the
reaction is defined as the excess mean absolute return in the 5 minutes following the announcement on announcement
days relative to non-announcement days.  The significance of the test.  The test uses the ratios of the absolute price
changes following the reactions to the mean absolute price at that time of day on either pre-BI days or post-BI days.
*** and ** denote significance at the 99% and 95% levels of confidence respectively.– 18 –
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Chart 2:  Cumulative Abnormal Returns
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